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1
There seems to exist the widespread concern that international capital mobility threatens na-
tional welfare states, as governments may find it increasingly difficult to finance public services
and redistributional policies with taxes. With respect to capital taxation, this effect is well
documented in the literature (see Dcvcreux, 1995, for a survey). Capital owners may escape
from a source based capital tax by shilling their capital to countries with a lower tax burden.
This capital outflow raises the marginal costs of public services; as a consequence, the equilib-
rium level of public services declines.
A large part of public services is not financed with taxes on capital but with taxes or contribu-
tions based on the factor labor. This paper deals with the consequences of international capital
mobility lbr these labor tax financed public services. There are mainly two reasons why a tax
on labor may affect the international allocation of capital. First, a labor tax may influence the
individual choice on labor supply where households substitute beiween labor income and lei-
sure. With a positive wage elasticity of labor supply, a labor tax reduces the supplied quantity
of labor. This effect leads to a declining marginal productivity of capital and therefore causes
capital outflows. As the wage level decreases with these capital outflows, the households fur-
ther reduce their supplied quantity of labor. Then the marginal costs of public funds are higher
with international capital mobility than in a closed economy. Consequently, the level of public
services may decline (see Bucovetsky, Wilson, 1991).
2
The second reason, why capital mobility may affect the level of public services with labor taxa-
tion can be found on labor markets where wages are set by collective bargaining between trade
unions and employers.
3 With collective bargaining, a part of the labor tax burden may be
shifted onto the employers by specifying a higher wage rate. In this case, a labor tax increases
unemployment, as the aggregate wage level further deviates from the competitive level. Capital
' Preliminary versions of this paper have been presented at the Universities of Rostock and Konstanz. We are
grateful to the participants at these presentations for their very helpful comments.
2 As Eggert (1997) has shown, this result will no longer hold, if the governments are able to raise a residence
based capital tax in addition to the labor tax.
' Centralized bargainig seems to be especially important with respect to the European labor markets. Siebert
(1997) provides a detailed description of the institutional characteristics of the labor markets in Europe.mobility may be presumed to worsen these unemployment effects of labor taxation, as an in-
creasing wage level causes capital outflows and thus further reduces the aggregate employment
level. Then the optimal level of public services would have to decline as a consequence of
international capital mobility. Lejour, Vcrbon (1996) formalize this view in a model where the
government chooses the level of contributions to an unemployment insurance.
However, the view that labor taxation is more distortionary in an open economy than in a
closed economy neglects the influence of capital mobility on wage demands of the trade
unions.
4 International capital mobility has been shown to affect trade unions' wage demands
fundamentally (Lorz, 1993, 1997):. With constant returns to scale and perfect capital mobility,
wage competition between trade unions leads to full employment as the equilibrium wages
decline to the competitive level. In this paper, we show that a tax on labor ceases to be
distortionary in an open economy where it may be distortionary without wage competition. In
this mode), the equilibrium level of public services increases with the international mobility of
capital: In an open economy, public services can be financed by a non-distortionary labor tax
where in a closed economy an increasing level of public services causes additional
unemployment.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic model of this paper and
derives equilibrium wages and labor taxes for a closed economy. Section 3 discusses the role
of capital mobility and derives the essential results of this paper. Section 4 presents some
simulation results to make our theoretical findings more transparent. Section 5 summarizes the
paper.
2. The Closed Economy
The capital stock is assumed to be fixed in a closed economy. Capital owners then cannot
evade high wages set by domestic unions. In order to simplify our analysis, we assume capital
and commodity markets are perfectly competitive whereas a national trade union monopolizes
the labor market. A single aggregate production function represents production of firms. The
4 In I^ejour, Vcrbon (1996), for example, unions regard Ihe invested capital stock as fixed.
* A similar result has been derived by Gabszewicz, van Ypersele (1996) for the case where governments set
minimum wages with capital mobility. A symmetric equilibrium in their model also implies a minimum wage
ai the full employment level.-3 -
national trade union sets the wage rate for the whole economy. The government sets a tax on
labor income. Both, the union and the government are aware that their policies affect the total
performance of the economy. Since the union bundles the interests of the workforce and the
government represents the aggregate welfare of the economy, there is scope for a strategic
conflict between both. In order to model this conflict in a game-theoretic framework, we
assume that all parties move according to a certain mover structure. This game will result in
substantially different outcomes in a closed and in an open economy.
The game in a closed economy comprises three stages: In the first stage, the government sets
the tax rate t, in the second stage, the union sets the wage w, and in the third stage, firms
demand labor input L. The game can be solved by backward induction. First, the optimal labor
input is derived for a given w and /. We assume the following production function:
(1) Y = F{L,K), FL,FK>0,FII:FKK<QFIK>0, FLLFKK-[F-] ±0.
The term Ydenotes output of the composite good, /, and K denote labor and capital input. In a
closed economy, capital cannot move across borders, but is fixed in production, i.e. K = K.
The price of the aggregate good is set to one. Labor input is derived by the condition that the
real wage rate should not exceed the marginal productivity of labor and that labor input can
not exceed the given total workforce /. .
(2) FL*w,L*L, [F, - w]\l -./„] = 0 .
In an interior equilibrium with unemployment, the wage rate equals the marginal productivity
of labor. A changing wage rate then affects the equilibrium employment level according to the
following equation:
(3) L = — < 0 for I > L .
* LI.
Equation (3) also gives the effects of an increasing wage rate at the highest full employment
wage level, the competitive wage w
c s FL(L,K} . Labor demand thus decreases with the wage
rate.
The union is assumed to maximize the sum of income of the employed v/orkforce and the
assistance paid for the unemployed workforce. This objective function is equivalent to the-4-
expcctcd income of all workers, as long as each worker laces the same probability of becoming
unemployed.'
(4) U(w) = [1 - i]wL{w) + w[L - L{w)\
The term /denotes the constant tax rate on labor income; w denotes the assistance paid to an
unemployed household. The number of unemployed households equals L-L. The union is
aware that labor input depends on the wage level according to (2). Assume w < vv
c[l -1]
holds. Then the union is belter off by choosing the competitive wage than by full unemploy-
ment. A situation with full unemployment therefore can be excluded. If the whole workforce is
employed, the union will be able to set the wage such that marginal productivity meets the
wage exactly. Specifying a lower wage would not increase employment but would decrease the
wage income lor the employed. Hence, any rational policy of the union does not specify a
wage which falls short of the competitive wage. Maximization of the union's utility leads to
(5):
• '•• vv- w
c |s[l-l\L + w/-„.J- wLn \ = 0.
We assume the sufficient conditions for a utility maximum are satisfied by (5). According to
(5) the union maximizes its utility either by setting the competitive wage or by setting a wage
which implies unemployment. In order to face a relevant problem, we assume the optimal pol-
icy of the union in a closed economy implies unemployment. A necessary condition for an inte-
rior solution of (5) is given by L + w Ln. < 0 at the equilibrium wage. The elasticity of labor
demand thus has to exceed the value of one. If this condition were not satisfied, the union
would benefit by raising the wage rate. Given that an interior solution exists, we may use (5) to
determine the wage response to an increasing lax rate:
(6)
r' See Oswald (1985) or Holmhind (1989) for an interpretation of this objective function and alternative specifi-
cations.-5-
Since L/ra. is negative for a utility maximum, the wage demanded by the union increases with
the tax rate. In an interior solution, the union sets higher wages in response to a higher tax
rate. A higher tax rate thereby leads to higher unemployment in this model.
7
Given the wage effects of an increasing labor tax, we now turn to the first stage of the game,
the determination of the equilibrium tax rate. The tax is raised for two purposes in this model:
On the one hand, the government has to finance the benefits w for the unemployed. On the
other hand, the government provides a public service G. For example, think of G as social
security benefits for old or disabled people.
8 The objective function of the government is given
by the sum of the union's utility, the income n = F\K,J^ - wL of the capital owners and the
utility V(G') arising from Ihc public service G;
(7) &[G,i] = U(w{l)) + 7t(w(l)) + V[G), VG > 0, V(;G < 0.
The government sets the lax rate I E[0,T], I < 1 - w/w
r, before the union sets the wage. The
wage reaction of the union thus depends on this tax specification. The expenditures for the
public service and for the unemployment benefits must not exceed the tax revenues and the
supply of the public service must not be negative:
(8) lw{l)L(w{t))-G-\v[l-L(w(l))]*O, GiO.
Since the marginal utility of the public service is positive for ail levels of G, the government
sets the budget constraint equal to zero in every case. Then, one may rewrite the objective
function (7) as a function of t only:
(9) Q(l) = V(l wL(w{l)) - w[l - L{w(t)j\) + U{w(t)) + n(W(t)).
1 This wage increasing effect of labor taxes does nol necessarily hold for other specifications of the union's
objective function. See for example Ilcrsoug (1984) or Holmlund (1989). Then the government would not face a
trade-off between higher lax revenues and higher employment even in a closed economy.
8 For simplicity, these services are not included in the union's objective function. Including them presumably
would not fundamentally affect the results for the wage setting subgame as long as the workforce is not the only
beneficiary of the public service but has to bear their full costs in terms of labor taxes.-6-
Increasing the tax rate has two different effects in a closed economy: First, it increases the tax
for the employed workforce and thereby increases the supply of the public good. Second, it
increases the wage demanded by the union. The second effect lowers employment and thereby
lowers tax revenues and increases the assistance necessary to support the unemployed work-
force. We assume for the remainder of this section the government realizes an interior solution
with G > 0. Hence, there will be some scope lor providing the pubb'c good in a closed econ-
omy, if the government pursues its optimal policy. Under these assumptions, one may use the
envelope theorem, i.e. £/u =0, nL =0, in order to derive the first order condition for the
optimal tax rate:
(10) Va • \\vL + l[L + wLn.]w, + wLH. w,}- wL - L w, = 0.
In order to discuss (10), let us compare it with the case of an undistorted labor market: With a
competitive labor market, the optimal policy would maximize Q = F(K,L) + V(G) -G, lead-
ing to VG = 1. Since /,„.-< 0 and L + wLK < 0, the level of the public^ good provided by the
government is lower for w, > 0 than with a competitive labor market. This result can be
explained by the three effects of a tax induced wage increase on the government's objectives:
First, higher wages imply a lower aggregate labor income and thus lower tax revenues. Sec-
ond, with higher unemployment, larger assistance payments arc necessary to support the
unemployed workforce. Third, higher wages decrease the income of the capital owners. All
these effects let the aggregate welfare in a closed economy fall short of the welfare with no
distortions on the labor market.
4. The open economy
The setting in an open economy is identical to that in a closed economy except that capital and
the aggregate consumption good are internationally mobile. In this setting, a union has to take
into account that a certain change in wages will result in capital reallocations which may affect
its utility. The capital allocation across countries depends on the wages set by all national un-
ions. Each national union is still in the position to monopolize the domestic labor market, but it
now plays a strategic game with the unions abroad and not only with the government. The
game ia the open economy consists of the three following stages: In the first stage, all
governments simultaneously set labor taxes, in the second stage, all unions simultaneously set-7-
wages, and in the third stage, the capital owners allocate their capital and decide about their
labor demand.
We assume capital can be transferred without any costs from one country to another, and we
employ a model with two tradables, capital and the production good. If capital is employed
abroad, it is assumed that the capita! owners will not move. Thus, we model a situation, where
capital is traded in exchange for (he aggregate consumption good. International trade leads to a
maximization of world production. This result in mind, the behavior of capital owners can be
determined by assuming that capital owners maximize world production minus wage costs
subject to given wages, which are set by the national unions. The restraints for this maximiza-
tion problem arc given by the maximum employment level in each country) (j=l...N) and by
the given world capital stock K" :
(11) max Y {/?'•(//.£'•)-vv'/A s.t. V K' = K", V s T.
V.K> £d I
 V
 ; J ^
; ;
One may solve this maximization problem by employing a Langrange function. This function





<&L. = F[ - w> - A
J =0, OKl = F£ - r = 0, $,=0, •
A
; aO, OA, zO, A*v. =0.
In (12), the shadow prices of the national labor supply restraints arc denoted by X. This
shadow price will be strictly positive, if capital owners like to employ more workforce in this
country but the workforce of this country is already fully employed. As it is never rational for a
union to set a wage below the competitive wage, we restrict our attention to outcomes for
9 As in the closed country, the case ]j = 0 can be neglected, because unions do no! choose such wages in
equilibrium.- 8-
which all X! are zero. The term r denotes the shadow price of the world capital supply. It is
equal to the world interest rate.
1
0
We now turn to the solution of the second stage of the game, the equilibrium wage rate. This
solution is described by the following two lemmas which hold under a certain restriction speci-
fied by (13).
(13) [l -1^1/+ w
C)'L['J ]-wlf, 0, " with
F' --
Equation (13) gives the marginal utility for union / of increasing the wage rate given competi-
tive wages in all countries. If this marginal utility is negative or zero, the competitive wage will
be a best response to the competitive wages set by all other unions. In order to distinguish
labor demand and wages in an international setting from the closed economy, these terms are
denoted by a star in this section. Equation (13) differs from (3), because labor demand does
not only depend on the wage level but also on the level of invested capital. Compared to (3),
the labor demand reaction to changed wages in (13) consists of two effects: the first effect is
similar to the effect in the closed economy and is given by the second derivative of the produc-
tion function with respect to labor. This effect is due to the marginal productivity changes for a
given domestic capital stock. The second effect adds to the first effect in an open economy but
is absent in a closed economy. This effect is due to the attractiveness of the country for inter-
nationally mobile capital.
The reaction of labor demand to a changed wage increases with a rising number of countries.
Hence, (13) will be met more likely, if the number of countries increases. Lemma 1 specifies
that the vector of competitive wages will be a perfect equilibrium, if (13) holds.
1
0 For symmelric countries, the competitive wage with international capital mobility equals the competitive
wage in a closed country. For asymmetric countries, however, this need not be the case.
1
1 The term /_/ . denotes the right-hand limit of (he differential quotient.-9-
Lemma 1: Assume the objective function of each union j is strictly concave in w' for
w' z w
r'' and w~' = w
c'
r. If (13) holds for all j countries, all unions will
set the competitive wage in a perfect pure strategy equilibrium.
Proof:
As already shown, no national union sets a wage below the competitive wage. Hence,
w'~ ^ w
q' for all countries. If (13) holds for all unions, it will not pay for a single union to
increase its wage unilaterally. We use (12) to determine the effects of a unilateral increase in
wages on labor and capital demand:
(14) F/,dlJ + J''[KdK' - dw' - dk>= 0 /
(15) F[KdlJ + F>JcdK
i -dr = 0.
Both equations hold for each country / and give the first differential of the condition for opti-
mal labor and capital input. Let the wage increasing country be denoted by k, and all other
countries be denoted by -k. At the level of competitive wages, k~
k is equal to zero, and an
increasing K~






k -dr = 0, for dK
k a 0.
The case is different for the country where the wage is increased. A higher wage means less
labor demand and less attracted capital. Since A is zero at the competitive wage, less labor










k -dr = 0, for rfL* s Q,dK
k * 0.
The marginal capital imports must add to zero:
(20) XdK
!=0.- 10-
Substilution.pt" (17) into (20) gives a relationship between dr and dK
k. Using this result to
substitute dr in (19) gives a relationship between dL and dK . Finally, (18) may be made
use of to determine the relationship between dL and dw . This relationship is given by jj*•
in (13) with k substituted for./. B
Lemma 1 is valid for all production functions satisfying the assumptions in (1). An equilibrium
in the wage setting subgame thus will exist lor the competitive wage vector, if (13) is satisfied.
For a linear-homogenous production function, the competitive wage vector is the only possible
equilibrium with international capital mobility. This result, formally stated and proved in lemma
2, can be explained as follows: A lincar-horriogenous production function implies a unique
relationship between the marginal productivity of capital and the marginal productivity of
labor. The world interest rate equals the marginal productivity of capital. Thus, it determines
the marginal productivity of labor in all countries. Suppose, wages arc above the competitive
level and arc equal to the marginal productivity of labor in all countries. Then there is at least
one country with unemployment. If the union in this country lowers its wage demands mar-
ginally, (hen the unchanged marginal productivity of labor will exceed the wage rate in this
country. Such a strategy is always beneficial for the union, as unemployment will completely
vanish in its country. There can not exist an equilibrium with wages above the competitive
level.
Lemma 2: // the production function is linear-homogenous in all countries, the only
perfect equilibrium in pure strategies thai may exist specifies that all unions
set. the competitive wage.
Proof: As already noted, in equilibrium A/ = 0, j=l...N, has to hold. A wage w < w thus
can not be an equilibrium strategy of any country k. It remains to show that a wage w
k > w
ck
also can not be part of an equiUbrium with linear-homogenous production functions. Suppose
in one or several countries, the wage rate was above the competitive level and /,* < L
k.
Because of k' = 0, F[ - w' and F*K-r . With linear-homogenous production functions, there
exists a unique relationship F^ = tj>'[F,' V resp. F/ =^'(^) with ij>"{-) < 0, resp. 0'
j(-)<O-11 -




k). This determines F
k = i/r*(vv~*) and
/')*=0*(V'~*(w"*)). Forany w* < 0*(v~*(w~*))> A* > 0 and therefore L*(W\HT*) = F".
Because (/*(»v*,//'j is continuos in w











k)). Thus, any w
k > w
h" can not be an equi-
librium strategy. B
According to Lemma 2, the only equilibrium that may exist for a linear-homogenous produc-
tion function implies full employment in all countries. Equation (13) specifics the condition for
which such an equilibrium exists.
1
1 As already mentioned, the existence condition is more likely
to be met, the larger the number of countries is. With a linear-homogenous production func-
tion, the existence condition will always be met, if the number of countries becomes sufficiently
large: For the number of countries approaching infinity, the sum term in (13) approaches minus
infinity. The effect of a marginally increasing wage rate on labor demand then can be written as
follows:
(21) lim //. =
Sincc a b'near-homogenous production function implies F,',F^K =[FI'K\, the labor demand
reaction approaches minus infinity in the limit. Then the existence condition in (13) is satisfied
in every case. '
We now turn to the salient result of our paper. According to the Lemmas 1 and 2, capital
mobility will imply a pure-strategy equilibrium in which all unions set the competitive wage, if
1
2 A linear-homogenous production function can he writien as F(K, L) S Lf(k), with k = K/L . Thus,
FK = f'{k) and F, = f(k) - kf'(k). Inverting FK and inserting the result in FL then gives $(•). In-
verting (j)(-) gives <p(-). The total differential of FK and Ft gives the following relationship:
dFJdFK =-*<0.
1
3 Ixmmas 1 and 2 are valid for symmetric as well as asymmetric countries. This extends the results of Lorz
(1993, 1997) where symmetry has been assumed at (lie outset.- 12-
(13) is valid and the production function is linear-homogeneous. Hence, we find that capital
mobility enables the governments to pursue their first best policy. This result is stated in the
following proposition.
Proposition: Assume the production function is linear-homogenous in all countries and
condition (13) is satisfied for all I
s &Q,t'\ Then a unique labor tax




for all countries j.
Proof: There will exist a unique equilibrium of the wage competition subgamc at the competi-
tive wage level, if condition (13) is satisfied. Thus fj = iJ and w' - w
CJ' irrespective of the
tax rale. Maximization of (9) then will give V(';[t' w
c' L') = l as necessary and sufficient
condition for the optimal tax rate in any country /. •
The labor tax equilibrium described in the proposition is the only possible equilibrium leading
to a pure strategy equilibrium in the subsequent wage competition subgame. The wages are
then at the competitive level in all countries. According to the proposition, this equilibrium will
exist and will be unique, if condition (13) is satisfied for all tax rates from which the govern-
ments may choose. As shown in (21), condition (13) is satisfied for a sufficiently large number
of countries. For a small number of countries, however, equation (13) may be violated for
some /
; E|0,f
J 1 In this case, union j will randomize over possible wages for certain high
labor taxes. Since we have not assumed symmetric countries, it might pay for a potentially
capital-importing country to set such a high lax in order to induce a high expected wage. A
high expected wage may benefit the country because it decreases the expected r and thereby
improves the expected terms of trade of this capital-importing country. If (13) holds for all tax
rates, this possibility can be excluded. Our proposition states that the government then will
pursue its first best policy. Compared to the closed economy in which the government has to
lake into account the distortionary effects of labor taxes, it is now able to provide the optimal
level of the public good.
Two effects determine the impact of international capital mobility and wage competition on the
equilibrium labor tax rale. The first is the effect of wage competition on the public, budget for a
given level of public services; the other is the changing level of public services. For the first
effect, assume G remained at the closed economy level after introducing capital mobility. Since-13- BWtothekdes institute
wage competition leads to full employment, no tax revenues arc needed to finance unemploy-
ment benefits. In addition, international capital mobility and wage competition affect aggregate
labor income. With an increasing labor income as a consequence of wage competition, the tax
revenues increase for a given tax rate. The tax rate can be lowered then without hurting the
budget constraint. The second effect is given by the increasing level-of public spending. With a
given wage and employment level, this effect causes the labor tax rate to increase. The overall
effect of capital mobility on labor taxes is therefore indeterminate.
In this model, international capital mobility leads to an increasing aggregate welfare, as given
by the government objective function in all countries. This result can be shown as follows: The









Equation (22) denotes the objective function of the government in an open economy. In a








The following function ?; denotes the difference between Q and Q :
(24) r, = j[Fi(K,L')- r)dK -{[F>(K, V) - r]dK
A country will import capital, if the marginal productivity of capital under autarky is higher
than r. On the contrary, a country will export capital, if the marginal productivity of capital
under autarky is lower than /-. In both cases, the difference between Q and Q exceeds zero.
Aggregate welfare in an open economy with trade unions then exceeds aggregate welfare in a
closed economy with an undistorted labor market. The distortion on the labor market leads to
a declining aggregate welfare in a closed economy. Thus, international capital mobility raises
aggregate welfare.
Three reasons lie behind the welfare effects of capital mobility: First, wage competition be-
tween the unions completely eliminates unemployment. Thus, for a given capital stock, aggre-- 14-
gatc production increases in all countries. The capital stock, however, is hot exogenously
given, but is allocated according to the comparative advantage of the countries. If countries are
not symmetric, this capital reallocation will further increase aggregate gross factor income in
all countries. This second reason for welfare gains is given by (24). The third reason comes
from the undistortcd supply of public services.
To derive the welfare effects for the different household groups, assume all countries arc sym-
metric. Then the comparative advantage effect on the distribution of factor incomes vanishes
and the analysis can focus on the effects of wage competition and the tax adjustment. The
income of capital owners and the welfare of beneficiaries of the public service clearly increase
with international capital mobility. In addition, even an increasing welfare for the workforce
can not be excluded: On the one hand, the wage rate declines for a given tax rate which
reduces the aggregate welfare of the workforce. On the other hand, the labor tax changes with
the introduction of capital mobility. If the labor tax increases, then the aggregate income of the
workforce will further decline. However, a declining lax rate will increase the income of the
workforce of the unions for a given wage rate. The tax effect may even outweigh the effect of
the declining wage rate on the income of the workforce. Then the union's utility increases. In
this case, all household groups benefit from the introduction of capital mobility.
4. Simulation Results
The last section has demonstrated that aggregate welfare of each country will be maximized
with perfect capital mobility. However, the results with respect to the union's utility and the tax
rate remain ambiguous. In order to shed some more light on possible changes of these terms,
we have simulated a specified model employing a constant elasticity production function and
an exponential function which measures the benefits of the public service. In order to make the
computations as simple as possible, we have also assumed all countries are symmetric with
respect to production technology, endowments and preferences for the public service. Because
of this symmetry assumption, capital mobility will lead to full employment at a zero trade equi-
librium so that the competitive wage in the closed economy also gives the competitive wage in
an open economy. The production function and endowments arc given by (25):
(25) Y = [aL-" +[l-a]K-
p]
W,K = 1, 1=1, a = 0.7, p = 2.- 15-
Assuming p to be equal to 2 implies that the share of labor income increases with the wage
demanded by the union. With a capital and labor endowment of unity, the competitive wage is
a = 0.7 and the corresponding capital income is 1 - a - 0.3 .
The objective function of the government is given by (26):
(26) Q = wL[l-l]+ w[L- i]+ rK +[l- <r
Y'
:^ w = 0.35.
The specific representation of the function V(G) has the property :YG(;/VG = .-y . Hence, y
measures the concavity of the utility arising from the public good. The following table summa-
rizes the simulation results for three different levels of y .
Table 1: Simulation results for y = {2,10,20}
 : ' -
Y
Optimal lax in closed economy
open economy
Wage in closed economy
open economy
Employment in closed economy
open economy
Union's utility in closed economy
open economy
 :
Capital income in closed economy
open economy
Public service in closed economy
open economy















































As shown in table 1, the absence of capital mobility causes high unemployment in this specifi-
cation. Additionally, the tax in the open economy may be higher (y = 2) or lower than in the
closed economy (y = 10, y = 20). For y = 20 even the union gains from capital mobility,
because the tax is reduced so substantially that the labor income net of taxes is increased. The- 16-
lowcf ihe non-disiorlcd level ol public services, the higher are the chances that not only capital
owners and beneficiaries of the public service but also the unions gain from capital mobility.
5. Summary
Our paper has demonstrated that capital mobility may enable a government to pursue its first
best expenditure policy. For a linear-homogeneous production function, the vector of competi-
tive wages is the only possible pure strategy equilibrium in the wage competition subgame.
Hence, capital mobility implies full employment in all countries. This result is due to the weak-
ened power of unions competing for internationally mobile capital.
The effects of international trade union competition, however, do not imply a similar tax com-
petition result. Instead, the governments set labor taxes to maximizx the net benefits of public
services - given net wages above the assistance level for the necessary taxes and given a suffi-
ciently large number of countries. The reason is that capital mobility already forces the unions
to the competitive wage level. Then the shadow costs of public services no longer contain the
effects on wage demands by the unions. Contrary to conventional wisdom, capital mobility
does not imply a collapse of the welfare state in our model but ensures the highest possible
social welfare.
In our model, aggregate welfare is increased by capital mobility in each country. Both, capital
owners and beneficiaries of pubb'c services benefit from capital mobility. Only the unions may
be afraid of capital mobility. But as our simulations have shown, this needs not necessarily be
the case. If the optimal level of public services is sufficiently small in an open economy, the
unions may also gain from capital mobility, because tax cuts may overcompensate for the
decrease in wages. These tax cuts are possible because no assistance has to be paid for the
unemployed workforce. In this case, nobody needs to be afraid of capital mobility.- 17-
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